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Members of the Commission: 
We greatly appreciate this opportunity to engage in constructive dialogue regarding a 
critical issue impacting on all employees and employers in this country - how to recommend 
an acceptable and fair mechanism to resolve workplace disputes. My name is Lawrence 
Lorber and I am testifying today on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers as a 
member of NAM's Labor and Employment Law Advisory Committee. I am currently a 
partner in the law firm of Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand in Washington. 
Previously, I served in several positions at the United States Department of Labor including 
that of Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), one of 
the federal government's major equal employment agencies. 
The NAM is a voluntary Association of more than 12,500 companies, large and 
small, located in every state. Members range in size from the very large to more than 8,000 
smaller manufacturing firms, each with fewer than 500 employees. The NAM is affiliated 
with an additional 158,000 businesses through its Association Council and the National 
Industry Council. NAM members employ 85 percent of all manufacturing workers and 
produce more than 80 percent of the nation's manufactured goods. NAM will proudly 
celebrate its centennial anniversary in 1995. 
The issue of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms goes hand and hand with the 
reality of the pervasive nature of workplace regulation. The feet finding report catalogued 
the growth of workplace regulation during the previous thirty and then twenty years. Much 
of this regulation can be traced to the multiplying laws on the Federal, state and local levels 
which have established rights on the basis of status for much of the American workforce. 
Thus, from the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938 which governed wages 
and hours to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, ERISA in 1974, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Civil Rights Act Amendments of 
1991, the individual employees have been granted a host of legal rights, all of which are 
designed to be resolved by the Courts after varying degrees of administrative review. And 
of course the National Labor Relations Act regulates organizational and representation 
activities but also established individual rights. However, both the NLRA and OSHA 
establish, in the first instance, an administrative adjudication mechanism which changes the 
forum of dispute resolution from Article HI courts to administrative tribunals, but which 
themselves experience the same degree of backlog and resolution delay. And finally on the 
federal level, the various programs which mandate affirmative action and non-discrimination 
for federal contractors sits side by side with their statutory siblings and which provide 
alternative administrative forum for dispute resolution. Exhibits IV-1 through IV-4 of the 
Fact Finding Report details even more graphically the scope of the coverage and the resulting 
explosion of litigation. To this we can add state and local statutes which mirror in coverage 
and requirement the federal requirements. 
• 
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This listing of laws is not meant to denigrate any of them individually or to question 
the proposition that the American workplace must be free of barriers to full opportunity. In 
our multi-cultural society, where we have expended so much effort to avoid the stratification 
and lack of opportunity for full employment opportunities because of status found in so much 
of the rest of the world, our commitment to full opportunity should be envied. However, 
because of the vast array of laws, regulations, and forums for resolution we have created, we 
also must face the fact that for many of the designated beneficiaries, the promise of 
protection is an empty one. A right without a method of meaningful and quick resolution of 
disputes is a rather empty gesture. While passage of these laws is often greeted by 
celebration and self-congratulation, "feel-good" legislation quickly becomes yet another 
component of the growing cynicism pervading our public functions. 
So too, for the employers who must attempt in their own fashion to understand these 
overlapping and often inconsistent or even contradictory legal requirements, and then face the 
same black-hole of administrative and adjudicatory delay, the response is one of 
bewilderment and disgust. It is difficult to understand why we have created a system which 
requires armies of lawyers and consultants to explain the basic proposition that employees 
should be treated fairly and considered on their merits. It becomes more difficult to 
understand why employers must commit a significant proportion of their resources to 
adjudicate issues in crowded courts which must allocate their priorities to resolution of 
societal issues such as resolution of criminal matters when most employment issues are 
factually unique and simply require resolution of disputes or differences which occur on the 
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factory floor or in the office. There is no benefit to an employer to have a Title VII or ADA 
charge languish for a year or more at the EEOC, and then, regardless of an administrative 
determination, face a multiyear litigation at tremendous cost. And during this time, the 
employee who lodged the grievance may still be employed, possibly working for the same 
supervisor against whom the grievance was first lodged, with the employer fearful of 
reviewing the employee on work performance because of the specter of a "retaliation" charge 
being added to the complaint and the employee obviously constrained by the fact that he or 
she believed that they were wronged in the first place. The lost productivity and wasted 
resources to such unproductive ends represents a serious loss to the American economy. 
While these observations may be self-evident, they form a necessary backdrop to an 
examination of how we begin to resolve this serious problem. The Fact-Finding Report 
listed several points of summation and then posed six questions for further discussion. I 
would like to address some of the conclusions and then attempt to respond to the questions 
posed for further discussion. First, I would suggest that while the Report clearly illuminates 
the dispute resolution problem, it summarizes the problem in a constrained manner. Two 
points may illustrate this observation. Summary 5 states that the private institutions 
Americans have traditionally relied upon to resolve issues without resort to government 
regulation or litigation, namely, collective bargaining grievance arbitration, declined in 
coverage and were limited in their finality by court decisions. However true in fact, this 
observation is basically irrelevant to the problems noted above. As I pointed out in this 
testimony, the laws enumerated above are primarily designed to ensure individual rights 
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based on individual status. There is no adjudicatory predicate for someone to be covered by 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, you either have a recognized disability or you do not. 
Collective bargaining grievance resolution requires that the individual be part of a collective 
bargaining unit, which is recognized by the employer, which has a collective bargaining 
agreement and which, in turn, contains a mechanism for disputes arising under the 
Agreement. While it is the individual whose grievance is processed, it is the recognized 
representative which determines whether it will pursue the grievance which is contained 
within the four comers of the contract. I would submit that there is simply no analogy 
between the two and reference to collective bargaining experiences may provide little 
assistance to understanding the massive employment law gridlock we are in. 
Second, the Report notes that the United States relies on civil court resolution while 
many other countries rely on tripartite employment courts. This is a commonly raised 
solution, but is one which must be seriously examined. First, we are unique is the scope of 
individual status rights we have created. While the European Union has an extensive labor 
code, it does not come close to the level of coverage our federal structure provides. Too, 
the degree of diversity in our workplace is not matched in other societies. Thus, the 
complexities of the problems we face are not experienced in other societies. But perhaps 
most important to a fair analysis of this issue is the fact that much of the backlog is 
procedurally driven. That is, whether a matter is resolved by an Article HI court or a hybrid 
adjudicatory body or before an administrative forum, we have a body of administrative 
requirements which would impact on the ability of a workplace tribunal to move with any 
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greater speed in dispute resolution. Two examples may illuminate this point. The EEOC 
just announced that its charge backlog now exceeds 92,000 cases. If the Commission takes 
in no other charges, it will take over 17 months to simply process what it has before it now. 
How many tribunals would be needed to resolves 92,000 charges? So too, the NLRB has 
been cited as an agency which works well. Its mandate is much more limited than that of the 
EEOC, it is a mature agency with a long institutional history and has a trained cadre of 
ALJ's. It's backlog is almost a year and it has nothing like the caseload faced by the EEOC. 
Thus, it would be helpful if examples cited as possible resolution of the problem or 
adjudicatory gridlock might address the peculiar aspects of the underlying problem. To 
ignore the distinctive nature of our problem doesn't move the discussion to a meaningful 
resolution. *• 
I would like to turn this testimony to the six questions posed by the Commission for 
further discussion: 
1. What changes in current labor and employment arbitration procedures are needed 
to deal with the broader range of issues and individuals involved in contemporary 
employment disputes? 
2. What is the appropriate relationship between private and public dispute resolution 
procedures? 
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The problem with these questions is that they presume an adjudicated resolution for 
every issue. In fact, fair mediation, perhaps accompanied by neutral fact finding may go a 
longer way to resolving this problem than different arbitration procedures. Thus, this 
Commission might profitably recommend alternative mediation techniques as a required first 
step before any adjudication. Many workplace disputes involve misunderstandings or 
divergent factual beliefs. If there were a neutral fact finding process, which would establish 
facts without reaching judgment, and thereby not be subject to adversarial contest, many of 
the disputes now pending should be resolved. Fact finding accompanied by mediation should 
be a first step to any adjudication. If the parties are unable to reach concord, then a private 
arbitration, which would be binding on both parties could resolve most issues. Recognizing 
that the administrative agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing statutory rights will 
not dissolve, they could play a constructive role by issuing interpretations or letter rulings, 
perhaps along the IRS model, to establish the legal framework for dispute resolution. Too, 
to the extent that a charge poses a novel or important question which might have to be 
resolved in a judicial forum, that charge can be certified for judicial resolution which would 
take the place of final private arbitration. If there is adequate fact finding, accompanied 
where necessary by timely legal interpretations, then the mediation-arbitration process could 
work. Thus, the agencies can serve, in most instances, an interpretation and gatekeeper 
function, while private mediation and fact-finding can take the place of the administrative 
review and where, necessary, arbitration can undertake the resolution of the vast number of 
surviving cases. Employers would probably have to bear a good portion of the costs of such 
a system, but the savings compared to the current morass would be significant. However, 
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the public savings would be significant as well. It's much cheaper to employ a feet finder 
than a judge. Thus, the total budget devoted to the administrative agencies might be 
examined to determine where reprogramming might provide the suggested services. 
3. What role, if any, should employees have in the design and oversight of workplace 
dispute resolution systems that involve issues of public law? 
The issue is perceived and actual feirness. It would not be inappropriate for either an 
agency with dispute resolution expertise such as the Mediation Service, acting in concert with 
the particular agencies charged with interpreting specific laws, such as the Department of 
Labor or the EEOC, to issue guidelines for dispute resolution mechanisms as long as they do 
not simply replicate is administrative guise the judicial gridlock we now have. If there is a 
fair mechanism, perceived as such, it should gain acceptability. While employee 
involvement in dispute resolution design sounds fair, it too reflects a dated picture of the 
workplace. Employee involvement is helpful, but the issues are so complex that expertise in 
the substance may be a more valuable input. Too, this commission has documented, and 
serious observers such as Secretary Reich have noted that our workforce is more transient. 
Secretary Reich wrote in his book, The Work of Nations, that workers can expect to have as 
many seven different jobs during their worklife. Thus, the attachment of a worker to a 
single employer is much less of a factor. It would thus make less sense to design a system 
which requires the formal input of a group of employees who may only represent a snapshot 
of a workforce continuum and who may be with another employer when the system is 
implemented. Whether they think the system is fair is less important than whether the 
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system itself is inherently fair. To achieve that end, the burden should rest primarily on the 
employer relying on appropriate guidance from relevant government agencies. 
4. How can worker-management committees or other forms of employee 
involvement be used to internalize responsibility for or resolve problems of occupational 
safety and health or other workplace matters regulated by public law? 
As noted in my response to question 3, the issue with respect to these technically 
complicated areas involves expertise and fairness. Employee involvement is a critically 
important aspect of sound and effective safety programs. Indeed, in the August 10 hearings, 
this Commission devoted extensive time to that subject. At that time, Rosemary Collyer, a 
former general counsel of the NLRB and who also had adjudicative responsibility under the 
Mine Safety and Health Act testified as to the value of employee involvement and the need to 
remove statutory barriers. However, to formalize such involvement, through mechanisms of 
required worker-management committees would not seem to be a productive outcome. The 
question supposes a dichotomy between the interests of management and employees in this 
regard so as to formalize their different positions. It is not the experience of many 
employers today, and most certainly many manufacturing employers, that they stand at a 
different position with their employees with respect to safety. Thus, it would seem most 
productive to encourage employee involvement without proscribing with rigid formality their 
shape, composition or mandate. 
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5. Should the U.S. government integrate and combine different agencies 
responsible for administering and enforcing employment laws and regulations? 
I believe that this would be an extremely welcome development. My own experience 
at the Labor Department, both in administering one agency but previously serving as 
Executive Assistant to the Solicitor where I had an opportunity to see the interplay between 
several regulatory programs convinced me that a single purpose agencies are not productive. 
Merely listing the contradictions and overlap between the workplace laws listed in this 
statement could fill a volume of testimony. Single purpose agencies have neither the 
mandate nor the institutional incentive to cooperate. Employers and employees have the 
constant frustration of duplicative investigations of the same occurrence. The conflict 
between agencies, such as the inability of the EEOC and NLRB to come to a common 
understanding of the interplay between the ADA and the NLRA is extremely frustrating. 
However, a common agency is not a panacea unless that agency can establish a mechanism 
to resolve conflicts. For example, the Wage and Hour Division at the Labor Department has 
issued an interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act with respect to alternative 
employment which, it admits, conflicts with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act's 
requirement for reasonable accommodation. Of course for employers, §503 of the 
Rehabilitation Act which deals with employees with disabilities who work for government 
contractors is also administered by the Labor Department. Notwithstanding internal 
bureaucratic rivalries, common sense and experience over the last twenty years suggests that 
uniformity of interpretation and procedure is something to be desired. If one-stop shopping 
is good for training, it is certainly appropriate for regulation. 
6. Should the U.S. consider establishing a specialized branch of the judiciary to 
deal with employment cases? 
This was addressed previously. The issue is resolution, not adjudication. If the 
Congress would authorize the 500 or 1000 special judges which would be necessary, and 
which of course would never happen because of the cost, it should instead investigate means 
to encourage private dispute resolution, and keep the cases out of court. 
We appreciate the opportunity to present these views and commend the Commission 
for addressing a critically important issue involving workplace fairness and productivity. 
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